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NEUTRAL LAW AND EUROCENTRIC 
LAWMAKING: A POSTCOLONIAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
Maria Grahn-Farley* 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of international law is entwined with the colonial 
project. The colonial and postcolonial connection is evident in several 
international legal concepts.1 Sovereignty,2 international trade,3 and hu-
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. My interest in the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child comes from having been a child rights activist for 
many years and a National Board Member of Rädda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden), 
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Article. Thanks to Max Shterngel and Laura Scully for excellent editing. This Article has 
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thankful to Robert Blitt for the invitation to present this Article at the Conference of the 
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 1. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 26–27 (5th ed. 2003); Antony 
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1 (1999); Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third 
World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Con-
flict, 36 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 185, 192–93 (2004); James Thuo Gathii, Alter-
native and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Coun-
tries to International Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263, 265–66 (2000); Arnulf 
Becker Lorca, International Law in Latin America or Latin American International 
Law?: Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and Political Imagina-
tion, 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 283 (2006); James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Euro-
centricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 184, 185–86 (1998) (book review) [hereinafter Gathii, Euro-
centricity]. Even those authors who take a less critical position towards international law 
and human rights, regarding both as important tools for women’s and children’s rights 
activists, do not disagree with the view that international law and human rights are Euro-
centric. See, e.g., Savitri W.E. Goonsekere, Human Rights: A Eurocentric Ethic or a 
Legal Foundation for Freedom, Justice and Peace?, 7 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 81 (1995). 
 2. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 182–90 (2005). 
 3. See James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1013, 1031–33 (2007). 
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man rights are areas where colonial and postcolonial laws are inter-
linked.4 The deep structure of international law is still colonial even 
where the ties between colonial and postcolonial laws are no longer visi-
ble. The colonial structure is a European sense of entitlement to interna-
tional law as essentially European.5 This underlying structure reveals 
itself where Europe guards the boundaries of international law against 
the dissents of postcolonial States.6 I have come to this conclusion by 
making an in-depth case study of the lawmaking process of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC” or “Convention”).7 The 
CRC is the most ratified human rights treaty in the world. In fact, there 
are more parties to the CRC than Member States in the United Nations.8 
                                                                                                             
 4. See MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2002); 
Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 201, 204–05 (2001). 
 5. The argument of this Article builds on the scholarship of Third World approaches 
to international law (commonly abbreviated “TWAIL”), which often assert that interna-
tional law is inherently colonial in both form and substance. See, e.g., ANGHIE, supra note 
2, at 195. With this Article, I hope to add that, in addition to the more visible links be-
tween colonial and postcolonial international law, there is a link between European co-
lonial sentiments and postcolonial European sentiments—a commitment to international 
law as fundamentally European. 
 6. The term “postcolonial States,” as used in this Article, refers to mostly non-
Western States, many of which were former European colonies. In this Article, I do not 
refer to “postcolonial” as a school of theoretical thought as the term is used by Bhabha or 
Spivak, among others, in subaltern studies. See generally HOMI K. BHABHA, THE 
LOCATION OF CULTURE (2004); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, 
in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg 
eds., 1988). 
 7. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 144 U.N.T.S. 123 [herei-
nafter CRC]. The CRC is the first attempt to legislate what previously were moral in-
citements codified only in declarations, that is, without legally binding effect. Compare 
id., with Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959), and Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child, League of Nations, O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 23 (1924). 
 8. The United Nations has 192 Member States, while the CRC has 193 States par-
ties. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications, Decla-
rations, Reservations, Objections, and Notes to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/11.htm [hereinafter CRC Ratifi-
cations, Reservations, and Objections] (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). See also Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: Reservations and Declarations Made Upon Signature, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 168, 168–77 (listing the reservations and declarations, with official translations, 
of sixteen original States parties upon signing the CRC); List of U.N. Member States, 
http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). The Holy See is a 
party to the CRC, but not a Member of the United Nations. CRC Ratifications, Reserva-
tions, and Objections, supra; List of U.N. Member States, supra. 
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Every country is a party to this treaty except the United States of Ameri-
ca9 and Somalia.10 
A detailed examination of States parties’ objections to other States par-
ties’ reservations uncovers a colonial dynamic.11 The colonial legacy of 
international law is not simply a matter of inclusion or exclusion. Nor is 
it only a matter of neutrality or non-neutrality. Even though the CRC was 
drafted, adopted, and ratified with the possibility of the inclusion and 
involvement of almost every country in the world, the colonial structure 
is still present, not in the substantive legal outcome, but in the legislative 
process itself.12 
The CRC appears to be neutral: participation in the drafting process 
was almost universal, and dissent, in the form of parties’ reservations 
against specific provisions, was spread more or less evenly among re-
gions.13 Despite all this, the colonial past is carried through in the stage 
of objections. International law reveals its colonial structure in the law-
                                                                                                             
 9. The United States was active in the drafting of the CRC, but did not ratify the 
final text. See, e.g., U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Legislative His-
tory of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, vol. I, at 320, U.N. Doc. 
ST/HR/PUB/07/1 (2007), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Legis 
lativeHistorycrc1en.pdf [hereinafter Legislative History I] (referencing the U.S. proposed 
reformulation of Article 4); CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 
8 (not listing the United States among those countries that have ratified the CRC). 
 10. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. With 185 
States parties, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (“CEDAW”) is also a widely ratified human rights treaty and is similar in spirit 
to the CRC. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 513 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications, Declarations, Reservations, Objec-
tions, and Notes to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/8.htm [hereinafter 
CEDAW Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections] (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).  
However, the CEDAW was adopted in 1979, before the last wave of decolonization and 
during the height of the Cold War; therefore, unlike the CRC, the CEDAW is neither a 
postcolonial nor a post-Cold War treaty under the strict meanings of these terms. 
 11. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. The reserva-
tions and objections at the signing and ratification of the CEDAW followed a similar 
pattern as the CRC. See CEDAW Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 
10. 
 12. Evidence of a persistent colonial dynamic is apparent in the geographic patterns 
of reservations and objections. Whereas reservations are quite evenly distributed among 
regions—Europe, twenty-six; Asia, nineteen, the Middle East, ten; Africa, ten; the Amer-
icas, seven; and the Caribbean, two—the objections to reservations are clearly lopsided: 
all twelve parties making objections are European, and of the twenty-three parties whose 
reservations received objections, only two are European. See CRC Ratifications, Reserva-
tions, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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making process at the moment objections are made against reserva-
tions.14 
Theories based solely on exclusion and non-neutrality cannot explain 
the colonial structure of postcolonial and post-Cold War international 
law.15 Exclusion and non-neutrality are no longer as obvious as they 
were during formal colonialism. The CRC, for example, is a model of 
inclusion and neutrality, and the presence of a colonial structure is diffi-
cult to demonstrate through theories that focus on the substantive results 
of exclusion and non-neutrality.16 This Article adds a new argument to 
the postcolonial critique of international law: that international law is 
colonial within the legal method itself. Even when both the substance of 
the law and the procedural rules can be seen as neutral, a deep colonial 
structure remains.17 
                                                                                                             
 14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 15. K.J. Keith mentions the principle of “sovereign equality” as an example of a 
“neutral” principle of international law that also finds support in the legal tradition of the 
postcolonial State. See K.J. Keith, Asian Attitudes to International Law, AUSTL. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1, 4 (1967). 
 16. There is an abundant supply of publications and articles addressing the substance 
of the CRC. The United Nations Children’s Fund and Save the Children are major pub-
lishers in this area. However, what is generally lacking is a thorough legal analysis of the 
CRC and, particularly, a postcolonial analysis. For a critical analysis of child rights, see 
Maria Grahn-Farley, A Theory of Child Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV 867 (2003). Sonia 
Harris-Short has offered a postcolonial analysis of the use of the “cultural distinctive-
ness” claim in the reporting to the U.N. Committee, concluding that this claim was sel-
dom a justification for the noncompliance of States parties that appeared before the 
Committee. Sonia Harris-Short, International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and 
Ineffective?: Cultural Relativism and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 
HUM. RTS. Q. 130, 163–64 (2003). Thoko Kaime has undertaken a cultural analysis of 
both African cultural practices and the cultural values that the CRC represents, contend-
ing that once the legitimacy of common values is established, the CRC can be used to 
challenge certain African cultural practices harmful to children, such as female genital 
mutilation. Thoko Kaime, The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Cultural 
Legitimacy of Children’s Rights in Africa: Some Reflections, 5 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 221, 
233–34 (2005). Several scholars have examined the implementation of the CRC in devel-
oping countries, and there have been a few postcolonial analyses of specific provisions in 
the CRC. See, e.g., id. at 231–33 (analyzing Articles 6 and 3 of the CRC); Bart Rwezau-
ra, Competing “Images” of Childhood in the Social and Legal Systems of Contemporary 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 12 INT’L. J.L. POL. & FAM. 253, 265–66 (1998) (highlighting legal 
developments in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda towards implementing the CRC). 
Nonetheless, there has been no comprehensive postcolonial legal analysis of the legisla-
tive process of the CRC. 
 17. R.P. Anand describes this “belatedness” of the postcolonial State as follows: 
[I]t is not surprising to find Asian-African countries protesting against some of 
the old treaties and several so-called ‘established principles of international 
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the CRC, its guiding 
principles, and its unique status as both a postcolonial and post-Cold War 
treaty.18 Examining the reservations made by States parties upon signing 
and ratifying the CRC, Part II suggests that it is possible for international 
law not to be colonial. As dissent from the CRC’s values is evenly distri-
buted across issues and across the world, the Convention can be consi-
dered neutral law. Part III analyzes the objections offered in response to 
the reservations and notes a significant trend: only European States made 
such objections and all but two of these objections were directed against 
the reservations of postcolonial States.19 This Article concludes from this 
case study that international law continues to link colonialism and post-
colonialism, and that this connection is reflected in Europe’s investment 
in international law as a Western construct and in its continuing disre-
gard for postcolonial challenges. 
I. THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
A. The CRC and Its Guiding Principles 
The CRC was adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on 
November 20, 1989,20 and entered into force in September 1990, pur-
suant to Article 49.21 The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(“U.N. Committee”), the monitoring body of the CRC as provided in 
Article 43,22 consists of eighteen members23 elected by the States parties 
                                                                                                             
law.’ Finding several treaties signed during the colonial period, when they had 
no choice . . . they challenge them and demand their modification. . . . The 
newly independent States also rebelled against some of the economic and polit-
ical rights acquired by their former colonial masters . . . which they have felt 
and still feel are unreasonable and, although accepted by the present interna-
tional legal order, inequitable. 
R.P. Anand, Asian-African States and International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55,  
63–65 (1966). 
 18. The CEDAW, while similar to the CRC in spirit and universality, is not properly 
a “postcolonial” or post-Cold War human rights treaty because it was adopted in 1979. 
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 19. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 20. CRC, supra note 7. 
 21. Id. art. 49(1) (“The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day 
following the date of deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the 
twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.”). 
 22. Id. art. 43(1) (“For the purpose of examining the progress made by States Parties 
in achieving the realization of the obligations undertaken in the present Convention, there 
shall be established a Committee on the Rights of the Child . . . .”). 
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based on their expertise in child rights.24 The Convention covers every 
person under the age of eighteen.25 To avoid a controversial debate over 
abortion, the CRC is silent on when life, and therefore childhood, begin.26 
There are four guiding principles of the CRC.27 The first principle, ar-
ticulated in Article 2, is the right not to be discriminated against.28 In ad-
dition to the traditional minority protections of race, ethnicity, religion, 
and class, the CRC includes “legal status” as a protected category.29 
Thus, the Convention does not allow for distinctions between legal and 
illegal residents within a country.30 Providing that a State party shall not 
                                                                                                             
 23. As of October 30, 2008, the current members of the U.N. Committee are Alya 
Ahmed Bin Saif Al-Thani (Qatar); Agnes Akosua Aidoo, Vice-Chair (Ghana); Joyce 
Aluoch (Kenya); Luigi Citarella (Italy); Kamel Filali, Vice-Chair (Algeria); Maria Herc-
zog (Hungary); Moushira Khattab (Egypt); Hatem Kotrane (Tunisia); Lothar Friedrich 
Krappmann, Rapporteur (Germany); Yanghee Lee, Chairperson (Republic of Korea); 
Rosa María Ortiz, Vice-Chair (Paraguay); David Brent Parfitt (Canada); Awich Pollar 
(Uganda); Dainius Puras (Lithuania); Kamal Siddiqui (Bangladesh); Lucy Smith (Nor-
way); Nevena Vuckovic-Sahovic (Serbia); and Jean Zermatten, Vice-Chair (Switzerland). 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Rights of 
the Child: Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/members.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2008). 
 24. See CRC, supra note 7, art. 43(2) (“The Committee shall consist of ten experts of 
high moral standing and recognized competence in the field covered by this Conven-
tion.”). 
 25. See id. art. 1. 
 26. The CRC provides that childhood ends on the eighteenth birthday. See id. Moroc-
co suggested the compromise between the pro-choice and pro-life factions, urging dele-
tion of the original wording “from the moment of his birth.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group to Consider the 
Question of a Convention on the Rights of a Child: Considerations, ¶¶ 28–30, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/L.1542 (Mar. 10, 1980) [hereinafter ECOSOC, 1980 Report of the Working 
Group], as reprinted in SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 115 (1992). 
 27. See U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 3: Gener-
al Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶¶ 6–12, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3 (Mar. 17, 2003) (describing the “four general principles” of 
the Convention). 
 28. CRC, supra note 7, art. 2. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Norway initiated the inclusion of nonlegal residents for protection under the CRC. 
See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group to Consider the 
Question of a Convention on the Rights of a Child: Considerations, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.10 (1981) [hereinafter ECOSOC, 1981 Report of the Working Group], 
as reprinted in Legislative History I, supra note 9, at 320 (indicating Norway’s proposal 
to the 1981 Working Group to have each State party apply the Convention “irrespective 
of the legality of their parents’ stay”). The United States, which is not a State party to the 
CRC, was nevertheless an active participant in the drafting of the CRC and initially in-
sisted on excluding illegal immigrant children. See Legislative History I, supra note 9 
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only “respect,” but also “ensure” the right to nondiscrimination,31 Article 
2 secures a positive right. To “ensure” a right, a State party must take 
active steps against discrimination. For example, there is an argument for 
States parties to actively disseminate the Convention’s principles through 
affirmative action following the interpretation of the nondiscrimination 
provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).32 
“The best interest of the child” constitutes the second guiding prin-
ciple. Article 3 of the CRC states that a government shall in all matters 
concerning the child consider his or her best interest,33 an obligation that 
has been interpreted expansively in international child rights.34 In its 
official national budget, the Swedish government, for instance, provides 
for a child-impact analysis and lists the budget’s consequences for child-
ren.35 
The third guiding principle, delineated in Article 12 of the CRC, is the 
child’s right to be heard in all matters regarding the child.36 Through the 
right to be heard, the CRC establishes the child as a legal subject, a bear-
er rather than an object of rights. 
Finally, set forth in Article 6 of the CRC, the child’s right to life is the 
fourth guiding principle.37 However, this right is not a negative right as 
                                                                                                             
(indicating the U.S. proposal to the 1981 Working Group to have each State party apply 
the Convention “to all children lawfully in its territory”) (emphasis added). 
 31. CRC, supra note 7, art. 2. 
 32. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, General Comment 18, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 (1989), as reprinted in RACHEL HODGKIN & PETER NEWELL, IMPLE-
MENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 22 (4th ed. 
2002) (“The principle of equality sometimes requires States Parties ‘to take affirmative 
action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate dis-
crimination prohibited by the’ [ICCPR].”); U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of Initial Reports to be Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph 1(a), of the Convention, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/5 (Oct. 30, 1991) (“States parties are requested to describe the measures that have 
been taken or are foreseen, pursuant to article 42 of the Convention, to make the prin-
ciples and provisions of the Convention widely known, by appropriate and active means, 
to adults and children alike.”). 
 33. CRC, supra note 7, art. 3. 
 34. The Swedish Initial Report to the U.N. Committee interprets the “best interest” 
provision to include children as a group as well, for example, when budgetary decisions 
are being made. See U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1992: Sweden, ¶¶ 50–52, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.1 (Sept. 23, 1992). 
 35. See id. ¶ 14. 
 36. CRC, supra note 7, art. 12. 
 37. Id. art. 6. 
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in the ICCPR, which proscribes a party from taking a person’s life.38 The 
right to life in the CRC is positive, as the right to survival is one of the 
preconditions of the right to life, and it encompasses, inter alia, the rights 
to education, healthcare, and an adequate living. Furthermore, the CRC 
prohibits subjecting the child to capital punishment or a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole.39 According to Article 4, a State party 
shall use the “maximum extent of available resources” towards imple-
menting the CRC.40 If a country is poor, it is to seek assistance within the 
framework of international cooperation in order to fulfill its commit-
ments under the Convention.41 
B. The CRC as Both a Postcolonial and Post-Cold War Treaty 
The postcolonial critique that international law is inherently colonial 
and a representation of European values42 will be examined in this Sec-
tion. One version of this critique focuses on the fact that a minority of 
States created the laws that bind the majority of today’s States.43 When 
the United Nations was founded in 1945, there were fifty-one Member 
States; today there are 192 Member States.44 Obviously, the majority of 
today’s States were not represented in 1648, the other founding moment 
in mainstream international law.45 This is not the case with the CRC, 
                                                                                                             
 38. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 39. CRC, supra note 7, art. 37(a). 
 40. Id. art. 4. 
 41. For example, the comments of Brazil, Colombia, and Norway stress the impor-
tance of international solidarity between developed and developing countries. See 
ECOSOC, 1980 Report of the Working Group, supra note 26, ¶ 60, as reprinted in Legis-
lative History I, supra note 9, at 351 (Brazil’s proposal invoking “the framework of inter-
national cooperation”); ECOSOC, Comm. on Human Rights, Colombia, Question of a 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1324/Add.2 (Feb. 14, 
1979); Legislative History I, supra note 9 at 350 (citing Norway’s proposal at the 1981 
Working Group). 
 42. See, e.g., Gathii, Eurocentricity, supra note 1, at 185–86; Goonesekere, supra 
note 1; Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. 323 (1997). 
 43. The notion that international law is universal is a relatively new idea that came 
about with the establishment of the United Nations. Before the creation of the United 
Nations, international law was the law of European and Christian nations. See R.P. 
Anand, Family of “Civilized” States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, 
Defiance and Confrontation, 5 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2003). Non-European nations had 
to “qualify” for international law by proving they were sufficiently “Western.” See id. at 
22. 
 44. See List of U.N. Member States, supra note 8. 
 45. Mainstream international legal theorists recognize 1648 and 1945 as dates mark-
ing the origins of international law. Often, a distinction is drawn between the origin of 
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however. With 193 States parties,46 the CRC has a near-unanimous re-
presentation. Scholars like Anghie have connected the origin of interna-
tional law to the colonial project.47 The last major wave of decoloniza-
tion resulted in the independence of Zimbabwe (1980),48 Antigua and 
Barbuda (1981),49 Belize (1981),50 and Brunei (1984).51 In short, the 
CRC is a postcolonial treaty because the formal period of colonialism 
had, on the whole,52 come to an end by 1989, the vast majority of States 
parties having attained independence by the time of the CRC’s adop-
tion.53 
The cultural values argument also criticizes international law as Euro-
centric.54 Specifically, this argument asserts that the values of the Inter-
national Bill of Rights55 are rooted in Western liberal ideology56 and that 
this body of law places a priority on civil and political rights over social, 
                                                                                                             
international law in 1648 and the origin of modern international law in 1945. See ANGIE, 
supra note 2, 182–90; SHAW, supra note 1, at 25, 30–31. 
 46. CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 47. See, e.g., ANGHIE, supra note 2, 182–90. 
 48. U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Zimbabwe, Oct. 2008, http://www.state. 
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm. 
 49. U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Antigua and Barbuda, July 2008, http://www. 
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2336.htm. 
 50. U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Belize, Oct. 2008, http://www.state.gov/r 
/pa/ei/bgn/1955.htm. 
 51. U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Brunei, May 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm. 
 52. There remain nearly seventy non-self-governing territories classified as “depen-
dencies and areas of special sovereignty.” See U.S. Dept. of State, Dependencies and 
Areas of Special Sovereignty, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/10543.htm. 
 53. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8 (indicating 
that the CRC was opened for signature on Nov. 20, 1989). 
 54. Karen Engle writes about the shift in discourse among postcolonial States in the 
1990s from a strict cultural approach that sought to assimilate human rights to a deep 
suspicion that human rights law reinforces a neoliberal political agenda. See Karen Engle, 
Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 291, 291–92 (2000). 
 55. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (“Universal Declaration”) 
together with the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights of 1966 (“ICESCR”) constitute what is often referred to as the International 
Bill of Rights. See ICCPR, supra note 38; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 56. See Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589, 
605–06 (1996). 
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economic, and cultural rights.57 The U.N. Committee insists on a holistic 
view of the CRC and on the interdependency of all the rights in the Con-
vention.58 This approach mediates colonial tensions by emphasizing the 
interconnectedness of different generations of human rights, including 
the right to one’s culture. Article 4 of the CRC acknowledges the eco-
nomic disparities between the Global North and the Global South, requir-
ing wealthy countries to provide resources to help poorer countries 
comply with the CRC.59 
A persistent point of contention during the Cold War was which set of 
rights should take primacy. Whereas the Marxist-Leninist Eastern Block 
argued that collective socio-economic and cultural rights are a precondi-
tion for the fulfillment of individual civil and political rights,60 the coun-
tries of the West maintained that the former are grounded in the latter.61 
At the adoption of the Universal Declaration, for example, communist 
Yugoslavia’s U.N. representative articulated the Eastern Block’s posi-
tion, expressing concerns that the Universal Declaration only focuses on 
the individual, not on the need for a social structure and community 
within which the individual could enjoy individual rights.62 Representa-
tives of many African countries, which recognize collective rights in 
their regional human rights treaty,63 have also levied similar criticisms. 
The CRC is a post-Cold War treaty. The U.N. General Assembly 
adopted the CRC just a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 
November 9, 1989,64 and this historic event figured prominently in the 
                                                                                                             
 57. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV. 183 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter 183d Plenary Meeting]. 
 58. “Enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is inextricably intertwined 
with enjoyment of civil and political rights.” U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No. 5: General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003). 
 59. See CRC, supra note 7, art. 4 (“States Parties shall undertake such measures to 
the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the frame-
work of international co-operation.”) (emphasis added). 
 60. See, e.g., G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (William E. Butler 
trans., Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 2003) (1974). 
 61. See Alexandra Chistyakova, The Russian Bill of Rights: Implications, 24 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369, 376–77 (1993). 
 62. See 183d Plenary Meeting, supra note 57. 
 63. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, arts. 16–24, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (recognizing both the rights of “all 
peoples” and the rights of “individual[s]”). 
 64. See BBC: On This Day,1989: Berliners Celebrate the Fall of the Wall, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/9/newsid_2515000/2515869.stm (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2008); CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
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completion of the drafting of the CRC. The travaux préparatoires65 re-
veal that a virtual deadlock took place from the time Poland submitted its 
“draft resolution” in 197866 all the way to 1988. The end of the Cold War 
had been anticipated for about a year before the CRC drafting process 
was completed. During this period, most of the disputed issues between 
the two Blocks were resolved. The most salient breakthrough was the 
agreement to adopt an interdependent view of civil and political rights, 
and social-economic and cultural rights.67 And, in brief—as will become 
clear when I analyze the reservations to the CRC in Part II—the schism 
between East and West so often reflected in reservations or abstentions is 
nowhere to be found.68 
II. DISSENT EXPRESSED IN RESERVATIONS 
While it is possible to point to provisions in the CRC that are vulnera-
ble to a postcolonial critique, there are ample examples in the drafting 
process of efforts to be as inclusive as possible towards the postcolonial 
States, for instance, through the Working Group to the Commission on 
Human Rights (“Working Group”).69 Compared to the Universal Decla-
ration, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, which were adopted when most 
contemporary postcolonial States were still under colonial rule, it is more 
difficult to make a clear argument that the values of the CRC exclude 
postcolonial States’ values. However, this is not to say that postcolonial 
States did not raise objections to certain CRC provisions. One key indi-
cator of such dissent is States parties’ reservations made at the signing 
and ratification of the CRC. 
The CRC has a two-step process for States to become parties to the 
Convention: Article 46 opens up the CRC “for signature by all States,” 
and Article 47 notes that the CRC “is subject to ratification.”70 Signing 
                                                                                                             
 65. See generally DETRICK, supra note 26. 
 66. See Question of a Convention of the Rights of a Child: Poland, Draft Resolution, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1366 (Feb. 7, 1978), reprinted in Legislative History I, supra note 9, 
at 32–35. 
 67. See DETRICK supra note 26, at 27. 
 68. The split over the two covenants—the ICCPR and the ICESCR—is an example of 
how the Cold War divide was reflected in General Assembly voting: the Eastern Block 
abstained from voting for the ICCPR, and the Western nations abstained from voting for 
the ICESCR. 
 69. See DETRICK supra note 26, at 21–22 (“The ‘open-ended’ nature of the Working 
Group meant that any of the forty-three states represented on the [U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights] could participate. All other Member States of the United Nations could 
send ‘observers’ (with the right to take the floor), as could intergovernmental organiza-
tions.”). 
 70. CRC, supra note 7, arts. 46–47. 
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indicates the intention of a State to become a party to the treaty, and rati-
fication indicates that a State has become a party to the treaty. A State 
party can express its dissent from a treaty provision by making declara-
tions and reservations in connection with the signing and/or ratification 
of the treaty.71 Regardless of whether state representatives refer to their 
unilateral statement as a “reservation” or as a “declaration,” treaty law 
provides that any unilateral statement functions as a reservation when the 
statement has an effect on how the State party would be bound by the 
treaty.72 And when a State makes a reservation against a treaty provision, 
the specific treaty provision binds neither the particular State that made 
the reservation, nor any other State in relation to this State.73 
However, a reservation does not undo the binding effect of the provision 
in relation to other States.74 In short, a reservation is a unilateral expres-
sion of a State party’s dissenting position regarding a particular provision 
in a treaty. States parties need not ask the organizational body for per-
mission or obtain an agreement with other States to make the reservation, 
except where specifically required to do so by a given treaty.75 The posi-
tion the International Court of Justice took in the Reservations case—that 
is, if the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty, the State making the reservation is not considered a party to the 
                                                                                                             
 71. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) defines 
“reservation” as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports 
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that State.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(d), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This provision interprets reserva-
tions as normative and as expressions of specific values, but it does not take a position on 
the general strategic value of reservations and objections within treaty law. For an exami-
nation of the doctrinal role of CRC reservations and the Vienna Convention, see  
Lawrence J. Leblanc, Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Ma-
croscopic View of State Practice, 4 INT’L. J. CHILD. RTS. 357 (1996). Leblanc concludes 
that allowing reservations likely facilitated a greater number of States parties ratifying the 
CRC, but the reservations, many of which were of a general character, make it difficult to 
assess the CRC’s impact in specific countries. Id. at 380. Further, Leblanc finds that the 
objections made against reservations were, as a group, internally inconsistent; objections 
were directed to the reservations of some States, but not to others with the same reserva-
tion, and there were some general reservations to which no State objected. Id. Leblanc’s 
ultimate conclusion is that such anomalies are to be expected under current treaty law. 
See id. 
 72. See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 2(d). 
 73. See id. art. 21(a). 
 74. See id. art. 21(b)(2). 
 75. See id. art. 19. 
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treaty—was not followed regarding the CRC.76 Here, each of the States 
parties objecting to reservations based on the understanding that they 
were incompatible with and against the object and the purpose of the 
CRC nonetheless noted that it still considered the reserving State to be a 
party to the Convention.77 
A. Reservations by Geographic Regions 
Of the 193 States parties to the CRC, 119 made no reservations upon 
signing and ratifying the CRC.78 A plurality of the remaining seventy-
four States that submitted reservations are European.79 According to  
region, the following are the total numbers of reservations: Europe,  
twenty-six80; Asia, nineteen81; the Middle East, ten82; Africa, ten83; the 
Americas, seven84; and the Caribbean, two.85 This empirical evidence 
suggests that Europe, as a region, was most dissatisfied with the sub-
stance of the CRC, followed by Asia.86 
                                                                                                             
 76. See Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28, 1951) [hereinafter ICJ Advi-
sory Opinion] (“It has . . . been argued that any State entitled to become a party to the 
Genocide Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by virtue of its 
sovereignty. The Court cannot share this view. It is obvious that so extreme an applica-
tion of the idea of State sovereignty could lead to a complete disregard of the object and 
purpose of the Convention.”). 
 77. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia). 
 81. See id. (Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, China, the Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar (Burma), New Zealand, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, and Thailand). 
 82. See id. (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tur-
key, and the United Arab Emirates). 
 83. See id. (Algeria, Botswana, Djibouti, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moroc-
co, Swaziland, and Tunisia). 
 84. See id. (Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela). Note that the United States is not a party to the CRC and has therefore not made 
any reservations. See id. 
 85. See id. (Bahamas and Cuba). 
 86. The classification of reserving States into geographic regions is not statistically 
adjusted for how many States parties to the CRC are in each region. Consequently, such 
categorization should be regarded only as an indicator of regional patterns. 
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B. The Substance of the Reservations 
Examining the reservations’ substance reveals that most are clustered 
around specific issues. There are eight areas into which the majority of 
reservations can be grouped: child soldiers; the definition of the child; 
freedom of religion; appeals and legal representation; children in the cus-
tody of the State; adoption; minority protection (identity); and general 
reservations. 
1. Child Soldiers87 
Article 38 of the CRC establishes fifteen, instead of eighteen, as the 
minimum age for recruitment to armed forces and participation in direct 
hostilities.88 In a surprising turn during the drafting process, the United 
States, though ultimately not a State party to the CRC, and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (“U.S.S.R.”) both actively lobbied to promote 
this minimum age of fifteen.89 They argued that the Working Group did 
not have the mandate “to review existing standards in international 
law.”90 Although the U.S.S.R. dissolved prior to the signing and ratifica-
tion of the CRC, Russia succeeded the U.S.S.R. as a State party to the 
CRC.91 Many other States, however, championed a minimum age of 
eighteen, and the tensions over this issue during the drafting of the CRC 
ran so high as to threaten consensus adoption by the General Assembly.92 
Finally, a compromise was reached: stipulate the age of fifteen in the 
CRC, but offer an Optional Protocol93 setting eighteen as the age for both 
                                                                                                             
 87. The following countries made reservations in connection with Article 38 of the 
CRC: Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, the Netherlands, Pol-
and, Serbia-Montenegro, Spain, Switzerland, and Uruguay. CRC Ratifications, Reserva-
tions, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 88. CRC, supra note 7, art. 38(2) (“States Parties shall take all feasible measures to 
ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part 
in hostilities.”); id. art. 38(3) (“States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who 
has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces.”).  
 89. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a 
Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶¶ 603–04, 608, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/48 
(Mar. 2, 1989) [hereinafter ECOSOC, 1989 Report of the Working Group], as reprinted 
in DETRICK, supra note 26, at 513–14. 
 90. Id. ¶ 604, as reprinted in DETRICK, supra note 26, at 514. 
 91. Russia became a State party to the CRC in August 1990. CRC Ratifications, Res-
ervations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 92. See 1989 Report of the Working Group, ¶ 605, as reprinted in DETRICK, supra 
note 26, at 514. 
 93. There are two optional protocols to the CRC. Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 
54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000); Optional Protocol to the Convention 
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recruitment to armed forces and direct participation in hostilities.94 Res-
ervations made in response to Article 38 grew in number as States unila-
terally bound themselves not to militarily recruit children under the age 
of eighteen, instead of those under fifteen.95 The other reservations in 
connection with Article 38 were made in the form of declarations where-
in the State party notes its regret and disappointment with the inclusion 
of the age of fifteen as the minimum age.96 In total, twelve States made 
reservations with respect to Article 38, all favoring the age of eighteen 
for military recruitment.97 Eight of the countries are from Europe, and 
four represent the Americas.98 
2. The Definition of the Child99 
As previously noted, the CRC drafters deliberately abstained100 from 
setting forth in Article 1 when life begins.101 Notwithstanding this ob-
vious attempt to avoid embroilment in the debate on abortion, several 
reservations regarding Article 1 and its definition of the child were made 
                                                                                                             
on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Porno-
graphy, G.A. Res 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000). 
 94. See 1989 Report of the Working Group, supra note 92, ¶ 610, as reprinted in 
DETRICK, supra note 26, at 515. 
 95. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 96. Argentina’s declaration, for example, reads as follows: 
Concerning [A]rticle 38 of the Convention, the Argentine Republic declares 
that it would have liked the Convention categorically to prohibit the use of 
children in armed conflicts. Such a prohibition exists in its domestic law which, 
by virtue of [A]rticle 41 of the Convention, it shall continue to apply in this re-
gard. 
Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 99. The following countries made reservations regarding Article 1 of the CRC: Ar-
gentina, Botswana, Cuba, Guatemala, the Holy See, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, 
and the United Kingdom. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra 
note 8. 
 100. Morocco suggested a compromise between the States parties that see life as be-
ginning at conception and those that see life as beginning at birth, delineating childhood 
with reference to its termination—the eighteenth birthday (a suggestion the Working 
Group adopted). See ECOSOC, 1980 Report of the Working Group, supra note 26, ¶¶ 
29–30, 32–36 (discussing the beginning of life and the termination of childhood). 
 101. CRC, supra note 7, art. 1 (“For the purposes of the present Convention, a child 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applica-
ble to the child, majority is attained earlier.”). 
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with domestic abortion policies in mind.102 The reservations are of three 
types.103 Regarding the first, the State party makes an affirmative asser-
tion that the CRC does not cover the unborn child, only the live-born 
child. The United Kingdom and Cuba made this kind of reservation.104 
The second type involves an overt claim that life begins at conception, a 
position taken by Argentina, Guatemala, and the Holy See.105 The repre-
sentatives of these countries argue that the CRC therefore covers the 
rights of the unborn child.106 The third type of reservation, made by 
Botswana and Indonesia, claims that Article 1 conflicts with national 
law, but does not further elaborate.107 
3. Freedom of Religion108 
The cultural values critique charges that international law, especially as 
regards human rights, favors Christian values over those of other reli-
gions, especially Islam.109 As the freedom of religion includes the right to 
                                                                                                             
 102. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8 (Argentina, 
Botswana, Cuba, Guatemala, the Holy See, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, and the 
United Kingdom). 
 103. Liechtenstein’s reservation, which asserts that the age of majority is twenty, is 
outside of the traditional abortion debate. See id. 
 104. See id. (“The United Kingdom interprets the Convention as applicable only fol-
lowing a live birth.”). 
 105. See id. 
 106. For example, Guatemala made the following reservation regarding the beginning 
of life: 
With reference to [A]rticle 1 of the Convention, and with the aim of giving le-
gal definition to its signing of the Convention, the Government of Guatemala 
declares that [A]rticle 3 of its Political Constitution establishes that: ‘[t]he State 
guarantees and protects human life from the time of its conception, as well as 
the integrity and security of the individual.’ 
Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Reservations to Article 14 of the CRC were made by Algeria, Bangladesh, Dji-
bouti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Oman, Poland, 
Qatar, Singapore, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. See id. 
 109. See, e.g., ANGHIE, supra note 2, at 13–31 (discussing Francisco de Vitoria and the 
colonial origins of international law); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF 
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 131 (2002) (dis-
cussing the “Christian” underpinnings of the “universalism” of early international law 
theorists such as Grotius and Vattel); SHAW, supra note 1, at 22–23 (describing the de-
velopment of international law in the middle of the seventeenth century as a Christian and 
European institution). 
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adopt a new religion,110 it may clash with Islamic views. Since the draft-
ing of the Universal Declaration in 1948, a number of Islamic States 
have not dissented from the right to belong to any religion, or the right 
not to be discriminated against because of one’s religious beliefs or 
membership in a minority religion.111 Rather, several of these States have 
objected to allowing people to convert to another religion,112 contending 
that because Islam is the “right” religion it would be irresponsible for a 
government to permit people to abandon it.113 
Another argument against the provision granting the right to change re-
ligions is that the colonial project was partly realized through Christian 
missionaries persuading or compelling people to convert.114 Indeed, the 
role of missionaries in the colonial project, in part, explains why the 
                                                                                                             
 110. ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 18 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching.”) (emphasis added). 
 111. See, e.g., 183d Plenary Meeting, supra note 57. The Author prefers to use the 
term “Islamic States” because it is commonly employed in scholarship. It should be 
noted, though, that these States’ commitments to Islam and Shariah law vary in key re-
spects. See, e.g., Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the 
Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitu-
tions of Predominantly Muslim States, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947, 951 (2005) (assessing the 
constitutions of “predominantly Muslim states” and finding a “broad assortment of con-
stitutional views—ranging from Islamic republics with Islam as the official state religion 
to secular states with strict separation of religion and state”).  
 112. During the drafting process, Moroccan representatives explained that, under the 
law of Morocco, the child inherits his or her religious affiliation through his or her father. 
See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group to Consider the 
Question of a Convention on the Rights of a Child: Considerations, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1987/WG.1/WP.35 (1987) [hereinafter Morocco Statement], as reprinted in Leg-
islative History I, supra note 9, at 458. 
 113. See, e.g., 183d Plenary Meeting, supra note 57 (setting forth the Egyptian repre-
sentative’s comment exemplifying the positions of certain Islamic States). 
 114. This conflict is between a Christian positive view on the right to “adopt” a reli-
gion and the Islamic critical view that one is born into a religion. The Holy See empha-
sized the importance of individual choice and the freedom of the individual child to make 
religious choices. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working 
Group to Consider the Question of a Convention on the Rights of a Child: Considera-
tions, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/71 (1984), as reprinted in DETRICK, supra note 26, at 
241. Compare id., with ECOSOC, Paper Submitted by the Permanent Representative of 
Bangladesh, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39, annex IV (1986) [hereinafter Bangladesh 
Statement I], as reprinted in DETRICK, supra note 26, at 244 (emphasizing how Article 7, 
the predecessor to Article 14 in the adopted version of the CRC, “appears to run counter 
to the traditions of the major religious systems of the world”). 
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freedom of religion provisions remain contested.115 This argument was 
made during the drafting of the CRC116 and, consequently, the CRC uses 
modified language compared to the ICCPR. For example, the CRC does 
not explicitly use the word “adopt” relative to religion.117 
Many States made reservations regarding the freedom of religion  
provisions, which can be grouped as follows:118 Algeria, Djibouti (with-
drawn reservation), Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco,119 Oman, Qatar (with-
drawn reservation), Syria, and the United Arab Emirates all point to  
Shariah law.120 Bangladesh, Poland,121 and Singapore reference maintain-
ing parental authority over a child’s religious affiliation.122 Indonesia and 
Malaysia exhibit concern with Article 14 and how it bears upon their 
domestic legislation.123 And the Netherlands expressly construes Article 
14 as including a child’s right to change his or her religion and notes that 
this is in accordance with Article 18 of the ICCPR.124 
                                                                                                             
 115. Cf. 183d Plenary Meeting, supra note 57 (the comment of the Egyptian represent-
ative being an example of early controversy surrounding the freedom of religion provi-
sions in human rights instruments). 
 116. See Bangladesh Statement I, supra note 114. 
 117. Compare CRC, supra note 7, art. 14(1) (providing that “States Parties shall re-
spect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”), with ICCPR, 
supra note 38, art. 18 (providing that the right to freedom of religion “shall include free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”). 
 118. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8 (Algeria, Ban-
gladesh, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, 
Oman, Poland, Qatar, Singapore, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates). 
 119. Morocco’s reservation is typical: “[t]he Kingdom of Morocco, whose Constitu-
tion guarantees to all the freedom to pursue his religious affairs, makes a reservation to 
the provisions of [A]rticle 14, which accords children freedom of religion, in view of the 
fact that Islam is the State religion.” Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See, e.g., id. (“The rights . . . shall be exercised with respect for parental authority, 
in accordance with Polish customs and traditions regarding the place of the child within 
and outside the family.”). 
 122. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. (“It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands that [A]rticle 14 of the Convention is in accordance with the provisions of [A]rticle 
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966 and 
that this [A]rticle shall include the freedom of a child to have or adopt a religion or belief 
of his or her choice as soon as the child is capable of making such choice in view of his 
or her age or maturity.”). 
2008] POSTCOLONIAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRC 19 
4. The Rights to Legal Representation and to Appeal125 
The rights to a fair trial and to counsel in a criminal trial are corner-
stones of civil and political rights. The CRC extends these rights to the 
child within the juvenile justice system.126 The two provisions in Article 
40 that provoked the most reservations are the child’s right to “legal or 
other appropriate assistance in . . . his or her defense,”127 and the right to 
appeal a decision when it is “considered to have infringed the penal 
law.”128 Differences among the reservations made by States parties are 
minor.129 Germany and Switzerland made reservations to both the right 
to legal representation in Article 40(2)(v) and the right to appeal in Ar-
ticle 40(2)(ii).130 Belgium, Denmark, France, Korea, and Monaco made 
reservations against the latter provision.131 
                                                                                                             
 125. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Korea, Monaco, and Switzerland made 
reservations to the provisions regarding the child’s rights to legal representation and to 
appeal. See id. 
 126. CRC, supra note 7, art. 40 (“States Parties recognize the right of every child al-
leged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a 
manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, which 
reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others 
and which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s 
reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.”). 
 127. A related provision protects the child’s right “[t]o be informed promptly and di-
rectly of the charges against him or her, and, if appropriate, through his or her parents or 
legal guardians, and to have legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and 
presentation of his or her defense.” Id. art. 40(2)(b)(ii). 
 128. The child’s right to appeal a criminal conviction is protected: “[i]f considered to 
have infringed the penal law, [a child is entitled] to have this decision and any measures 
imposed in consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent, independent and impar-
tial authority or judicial body according to law.” Id. art. 40(2)(b)(v). 
 129. Regarding the right to counsel, Switzerland’s reservation is typical: “the Swiss 
penal procedure applicable to children, which does not guarantee either the unconditional 
right to assistance or separation, where personnel or organization is concerned, between 
the examining authority and the sentencing authority, is unaffected.” See CRC Ratifica-
tions, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. Regarding the right to appeal, Mona-
co’s reservation is typical: 
The Principality of Monaco interprets [A]rticle 40, paragraph 2(b)(v) as stating 
a general principle which has a number of statutory exceptions. Such, for ex-
ample, is the case with respect to certain criminal offences. In any event, in all 
matters the Judicial Review Court rules definitively on appeals against all deci-
sions of last resort. 
Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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5. The Child in the Custody of the State132 
The CRC bans giving children the death penalty or life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole.133 Malaysia and Singapore made reserva-
tions against the provision that bans corporal punishment, which falls 
under inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.134 However, the 
provision in Article 37 responsible for the most reservations is the de-
mand that juveniles in the custody of the State be separated from 
adults.135 Australia, Canada, the Cook Islands, Iceland, Japan, and New 
Zealand objected to this obligation.136 The justification commonly cited 
for such reservations is a lack of resources needed to create and maintain 
separate facilities for adults and children.137 Australia’s reservation in-
vokes the country’s geographic and demographic constraints.138 
                                                                                                             
 132. Australia, Canada, the Cook Islands, Iceland, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom made reservations to the 
provision on the punishment of children. See id. 
 133. CRC, supra note 7, art. 37(a) (“No child shall be subjected to torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life 
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age . . . .”). 
 134. Singapore’s reservation to these provisions reads as follows: “[t]he Republic of 
Singapore considers that [A]rticles 19 and 37 of the Convention do not prohibit the judi-
cious application of corporal punishment in the best interest of the child.” CRC Ratifica-
tions, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 135. CRC, supra note 7, art. 37(c) (“In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall 
be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child’s best interest not to do so 
and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspon-
dence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances.”). 
 136. CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 137. New Zealand’s reservation, for example, provides: 
The Government of New Zealand reserves the right not to apply [A]rticle 37(c) 
in circumstances where the shortage of suitable facilities makes the mixing of 
juveniles and adults unavoidable; and further reserves the right not to apply 
[A]rticle 37(c) where the interests of other juveniles in an establishment require 
the removal of a particular juvenile offender or where mixing is considered to 
be of benefit to the persons concerned. 
Id. 
 138. Id. (“Australia accepts the general principles of [A]rticle 37. In relation to the 
second sentence of paragraph (c), the obligation to separate children from adults in prison 
is accepted only to the extent that such imprisonment is considered by the responsible 
authorities to be feasible and consistent with the obligation that children be able to main-
tain contact with their families, having regard to the geography and demography of Aus-
tralia. Australia, therefore, ratifies the Convention to the extent that it is unable to comply 
with the obligation imposed by [A]rticle 37(c).”). 
2008] POSTCOLONIAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRC 21 
6. Adoption139 
Located in Article 21, the CRC’s adoption provision140 was added on 
the initiative of Barbados and Germany.141 The reservations against this 
provision exhibit two main strands, one concerning internal secular mat-
ters and the other involving Shariah law.142 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and 
Venezuela made reservations against Article 21 that are secular in na-
ture.143 Argentina stresses the need “to prevent trafficking in and the sale 
of children,”144 for example, and Canada references practices among its 
aboriginal peoples.145 Bangladesh simply notes that “Article 21 would 
apply subject to the existing laws and practices in Bangladesh.”146 
                                                                                                             
 139. The States parties that made reservations regarding adoption are Argentina, Ban-
gladesh, Brunei, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, Oman, Republic 
of Korea, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Id. 
 140. CRC, supra note 7, art. 21 (“States Parties that recognize and/or permit the sys-
tem of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration.”). 
 141. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, First Polish Draft Convention and 
General Comments, at Barbados comments ¶ 2, Fed. Repub. of Germany comments ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1324/ (Nov. 7–8, 1978), as reprinted in DETRICK, supra note 26, at 42, 46. 
 142. During the drafting of the CRC, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, and Tunisia collectively suggested that the 
“State Parties to the present Convention shall endeavor, in accordance with their domes-
tic laws and legislation, to provide an alternative family for a child who does not have a 
natural family.” See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group 
to Consider the Question of a Convention on the Rights of a Child: Second Reading 
(1988–89), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/WG.1/WP.4 (1989), as reprinted in U.N. Office 
of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Legislative History of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, vol. II, at 547, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/PUB/07/1 (2007), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/LegislativeHistorycrc2en.pdf [hereinafter 
Legislative History II]. 
 143. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 144. Id. (“The Argentine Republic enters a reservation to subparagraphs (b), (c), (d) 
and (e) of [A]rticle 21 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and declares that 
those subparagraphs shall not apply in areas within its jurisdiction because, in its view, 
before they can be applied, a strict mechanism must exist for the legal protection of child-
ren in matters of inter-country adoption, in order to prevent trafficking in and the sale of 
children.”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. In the drafting process, Bangladesh had expressed concern that foreign mis-
sionaries could exploit adoption to proselytize and convert children to Christianity. See 
ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Paper Submitted by the Permanent Representative 
of Bangladesh, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39, annex IV (1986) [hereinafter Bangla-
desh Statement II], as reprinted in Legislative History II, supra note 142, at 545. 
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Regarding the second type of reservation, several Islamic States outlaw 
adoption because it is viewed as inconsistent with Shariah law.147 For 
example, Kuwait’s reservation seems to equate adoption with the aban-
donment of Islam.148 Instead of formal adoption, many Islamic States 
practice kafalah, which does not obscure the original blood relations of 
the child, but is a permanent change of guardianship.149 
7. Minority Rights: Identity and Culture150 
The identity and culture reservations cover both the right not to be dis-
criminated against, as well as the right to belong to and participate in 
minority cultures.151 The United States originally opposed the inclusion 
of illegal immigrants in any elements of the CRC. 152 However, the Unit-
                                                                                                             
 147. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 148. See id. (“The State of Kuwait, as it adheres to the provisions of the Islamic Sha-
riah as the main source of legislation, strictly bans abandoning the Islamic religion and 
does not therefore approve adoption.”). 
 149. Article 20 of the CRC regulating the situation concerning children deprived of 
their families directly addresses kafalah as an option if the child is deprived of his or her 
family. See CRC, supra note 7, art. 20. The kafalah system is well-described by Syria in 
an official note sent to the Secretary General regarding Germany’s objection to Syria’s 
reservation: 
The laws in effect in the Syrian Arab Republic do not recognize the system of 
adoption, although they do require that protection and assistance should be pro-
vided to those for whatever reason permanently or temporarily deprived of their 
family environment and that alternative care should be assured them through 
foster placement and kafalah, in care centers and special institutions and, with-
out assimilation to their blood lineage (nasab), by foster families, in accordance 
with the legislation in force based on the principles of the Islamic Shariah. 
CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 150. The Bahamas, Belgium, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom made reserva-
tions to the general applicability or coverage of the CRC, and limited the coverage to 
legal residents in their reservations; France and Oman made a reservation to the minority 
rights in article 30; Venezuela’s reservation links Article 30 with Article 2. See CRC 
Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 151. Articles 2 and 30 of the CRC both establish the right to practice a minority cul-
ture. See CRC, supra note 7, arts. 2, 30. 
 152. The drafting process shows a split between countries that wanted to include every 
child and the countries that only wanted to include legal residents. Consider, for example, 
the comments of Norway and the United States. Norway’s comment during the drafting 
process was that the CRC should cover all children “irrespective of the legality of their 
parents’ stay.” See Legislative History I, supra note 30, at 320. The comment the United 
States made during the drafting process reads as follows: “[e]ach State Party to the 
present Convention shall respect and extend all the rights set forth in this Convention to 
all children lawfully in its territory . . . .” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1981/WP.1/WP.7 (1981), as 
reprinted in Legislative History I, supra note 30, at 320. 
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ed States withdrew its suggestion to distinguish between legal and illegal 
residents after a general debate in the Working Group. The CRC thus 
does not differentiate between the two.153 Its goal is to cover all children, 
regardless of their legal status, in order to eliminate gaps in protection.154 
Nevertheless, the Bahamas, Belgium, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom made reservations that seek to preserve the right to make a dis-
tinction between legal and illegal immigrants, especially with regard to 
accessing the public benefits of the welfare state.155 France156 and 
Oman157 made reservations against connecting the right to exercise one’s 
minority culture, as articulated in Article 30 of the CRC,158 with the anti-
discrimination provision in Article 2, whereas Venezuela made a reserva-
tion linking Article 30 with Article 2.159 
                                                                                                             
 153. See CRC, supra note 7, art. 2. 
 154. See id. 
 155. New Zealand’s reservation with respect to legal status is representative: 
Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of the Government of New 
Zealand to continue to distinguish as it considers appropriate in its law and 
practice between persons according to the nature of their authority to be in New 
Zealand including but not limited to their entitlement to benefits and other pro-
tections described in the Convention, and the Government of New Zealand re-
serves the right to interpret and apply the Convention accordingly. 
CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. Belgium’s reservation 
strikes a similar chord: “[w]ith regard to [A]rticle 2, paragraph 1, according to the inter-
pretation of the Belgian Government non-discrimination on grounds of national origin 
does not necessarily imply the obligation for States automatically to guarantee foreigners 
the same rights as their nationals.” Id. 
 156. France’s reservation suggests a contradiction between Article 2, grounding the 
right not to be discriminated against, and Article 30, establishing the right to exercise 
one’s cultural rights: “[t]he Government of the Republic declares that, in the light of 
[A]rticle 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, [A]rticle 30 is not applicable so far 
as the Republic is concerned.” Id. 
 157. Id. (“The Sultanate [of Oman] does not consider itself to be bound by those provi-
sions of [A]rticle 30 that allow a child belonging to a religious minority to profess his or 
her own religion.”). 
 158. CRC, supra note 7, art. 30 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or 
who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his 
or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own reli-
gion, or to use his or her own language.”). 
 159. CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
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8. General Reservations160 
The many general reservations constitute one of the most controversial 
consequences of the near-universal ratification of the CRC.161 Their pa-
ramount concern is that the CRC should be subject to religious and/or 
constitutional constraints.162 The States parties whose reservations con-
cern religious and moral constraints are the following: Djibouti, which 
cites religion and tradition; Afghanistan, Brunei, Iran, Kuwait, Maurita-
nia,163 Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, all of which cite Shariah law; and 
the Holy See,164 which cites Catholic doctrine.165 The Cook Islands,  
Indonesia, Singapore, and Tunisia give secular justifications for their 
general reservations,166 most commonly invoking their national constitu-
tions.167 
                                                                                                             
 160. Afghanistan, Brunei, the Cook Islands, Djibouti, the Holy See, Indonesia, Iran, 
Ireland, Kuwait, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Syria, and 
Tunisia made general reservations. See id. The reservations of the Cook Islands and Sin-
gapore reference their constitutions, whereas the reservation of the Holy See references to 
the Catholic religion and morals. Id. 
 161. The United States and Somalia are the only nonparties to the CRC. See id. 
 162. This approach—of broad-reaching general reservations—echoes certain reserva-
tions to the CEDAW. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1426 
(2003). 
 163. CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8 (“In signing this 
important Convention, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is making reservations to ar-
ticles or provisions which may be contrary to the beliefs and values of Islam, the religion 
of the Mauritania People and State.”). 
 164. Id. (“[The Holy See declares] that the application of the Convention be compati-
ble in practice with the particular nature of the Vatican City State and of the sources of its 
objective law (art. 1, Law of 7 June 1929, n.11) and, in consideration of its limited extent, 
with its legislation in the matters of citizenship, access and residence.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Singapore’s reservation, for instance, reads: 
The Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Singapore provide adequate 
protection and fundamental rights and liberties in the best interests of the child. 
The accession to the Convention by the Republic of Singapore does not imply 
the acceptance of obligations going beyond the limits prescribed by the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Singapore nor the acceptance of any obligation to in-
troduce any right beyond those prescribed under the Constitution. 
Id. 
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C. Summary of the Cultural Values Critique 
The reservations States parties submitted do not reveal an overarching 
disapproval of the CRC or its goals.168 However, even within the clusters 
of reservations, States parties were motivated by different concerns cov-
ering a wide variety of reasons.169 Notably, Western countries made  
reservations to provisions embodying core civil and political rights,  
including the rights to a fair trial, to appeal, to legal representation, to 
culture, and to nondiscrimination.170 The reservations of Islamic States 
center around the freedom of religion, referencing a disjuncture between 
Shariah law and the CRC’s provisions regarding the freedom of con-
science and adoption.171 Another significant religious divide is between 
Catholic countries, which insist that life begins at conception, and States 
parties that fix the legal entitlement to human rights at birth.172 
In sum, the apparent disagreements can be traced to competing cultural 
values, but these disagreements are quite evenly spread among States 
parties and across the CRC. Some points of contention, such as the free-
dom of religion and certain aspects of the issue of adoption, may partly 
originate from a colonial context, but do not exclusively have colonial-
ism as their origin and reason.173 
                                                                                                             
 168. There is a distinction between claiming that the CRC process does not represent a 
general bias against specific cultures and arguing that the CRC process does not indicate 
any biases at all. My argument is not that the process of drafting, signing, and ratifying 
the CRC was without bias, but, rather, that the biases evident in the process were not 
limited to a single region or culture. In fact, the biases evident in the process were di-
rected at, or apparent in, the actions of representatives of many regions and cultures. 
Bonny Ibhawoh has written about the danger of taking a static view of culture, which 
would undercut the cultural legitimacy of human rights. See Bonny Ibhawoh, Between 
Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the 
African State, HUM. RTS. Q. 838, 841–42 (2000). 
 169. For example, in the reservations to the CRC’s provision on adoption, some States 
parties made religiously motivated reservations, and others made reservations with refer-
ence to internal administration of the matter. See supra notes 139–49 and accompanying 
text. 
 170. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. In the drafting of CRC, Bangladesh suggested a modification regarding adoption 
in order to avoid a conflict with Islamic inheritance law, and also suggested a provision 
further protecting orphans from proselytization. See Bangladesh Statement II, supra note 
146, at 544–45. Morocco echoed the concerns of Bangladesh regarding inheritance law. 
See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group to Consider the 
Question of a Convention on the Rights of a Child: Considerations, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1987/25 (1987), as reprinted in Legislative History II, supra note 142, at 545. 
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III. EUROPE’S REACTION TO POSTCOLONIAL DISSENT 
The postcolonial critique is not as easily applied to the CRC as to hu-
man rights instruments adopted before the final stages of colonialism. It 
is daunting to levy a postcolonial critique against the CRC, given its al-
most universal ratification and the inclusion of postcolonial States in the 
drafting of the Convention. While the remains of a colonial legacy may 
be found in both the context of the CRC and parties’ reservations, it 
would be a struggle to argue that postcolonial States disapproved of the 
very treaty that they ratified, especially when the reservations are rela-
tively balanced geographically.174 This Article now proceeds to analyze 
the objections made against reservations, where the deep colonial struc-
ture of international law becomes strikingly clear. 
If a State party does not want to be bound by or indeed does not agree 
with a reservation made by another State party, it may communicate an 
objection to the reservation. Objections to reservations are regulated by 
Article 51 of the CRC and Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention, both 
of which provide that a State party may object to a reservation that is 
“incompatible with the object and purpose” of the Convention.175 The 
Vienna Convention also states, “A reservation incompatible with the ob-
ject and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.”176 
However, in contrast to the parties that made objections in connection 
with the Genocide Convention, each State objecting in connection with 
the CRC insisted on the reserving State still being bound by the Conven-
tion, even when the reservation in question was perceived as being in-
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty itself.177 
Unlike the more fragmented patterns apparent in the reservations, a 
unified theme emerges after analysis of the objections to reservations. 
All twelve States parties objecting to reservations made at the signing 
and ratification of the CRC are European: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Slovakia, and Sweden.178 Twenty-three States parties’ reservations re-
ceived objections, and of these countries, only two are European.179 Mul-
                                                                                                             
 174. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text. 
 175. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 19(c). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Compare CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8, with ICJ 
Advisory Opinion, supra note 76, at 24. 
 178. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 179. The remaining States parties whose reservations received objections are Bangla-
desh, Botswana, Brunei, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Myanmar (Burma), Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. See id. 
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tiple States parties can object to the same reservation, and each State par-
ty can deliver multiple objections; there were a total of eighty-nine ob-
jections.180 Again, only two objections are directed towards reservations 
of European countries; the Netherlands directed objections to the reser-
vations of Andorra and Liechtenstein. The remaining eighty-seven are 
against the reservations of non-Western countries.181 
A. Objections to Reservations 
In the legislative process, the objection phase is the first occasion 
where the States parties relate directly to each other rather than to the 
document. That is, before the objection phase, all discussions and negoti-
ations are focused on the treaty itself, either through drafting or through 
dissent to the material outcome of the drafting process in the form of res-
ervations. By the time that States parties make objections, the treaty text 
is complete. 
Regarding the CRC, the general reservations prompted the majority of 
objections. With the exception of the Holy See, non-European countries 
made the general reservations, all of which are either normative (i.e., 
based on religious and/or moral premises) or legalistic (i.e., grounded in 
the supremacy of national legislation relative to the CRC).182 With the ex-
ception of Afghanistan and the Holy See, States parties that made general 
reservations in reference to religion met with objections.183 Afghanistan 
made a general reservation upon signing the CRC, but its representatives 
did not follow up with a specific reservation at the moment of ratifica-
tion.184 Of the States parties whose general reservations invoke national 
legislation, Indonesia, Singapore, and Tunisia received objections, while 
the Cook Islands did not receive any.185 
The reservation of the Holy See, to which no State party objected, 
reads: “[t]he Holy See, in acceding to this Convention, does not intend to 
                                                                                                             
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Again, the reservations of Afghanistan, Brunei, Djibouti, the Holy See, Iran, Ku-
wait, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria refer to religious and/or moral con-
straints, whereas the reservations of the Cook Islands, Indonesia, Singapore, and Tunisia 
refer to the limiting effect of national legislation. See id. 
 183. Madhavi Sunder describes the role of religion relative to international law thus: 
“[s]imply put, religion is the ‘other’ of international law.” Sunder, supra note 162, at 
1402. Sunder argues that international law treats religion as something irrational and 
primitive and, further, that the view of religion as a private matter obscures many human 
rights violations against women that take place in the name of religion. See id. at  
1403–04. 
 184. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 185. See id. 
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prescind in any way from its specific mission which is of a religious and 
moral character.”186 Compare this reservation made by the Holy See with 
the reservations of Iran and Indonesia, which prompted objections. Iran’s 
reservation states: “[t]he Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
reserves the right not to apply any provisions or articles of the Conven-
tion that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international legis-
lation in effect.”187 And Indonesia’s reservation notes: “[t]he ratification 
of the [CRC] by the Republic of Indonesia does not imply the acceptance 
of obligations going beyond the Constitutional limits nor the acceptance 
of any obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under 
the Constitution.”188 Austria’s objection to the reservations of Brunei, 
Kiribati, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia is framed as follows: “Austria could 
not consider the reservation[s] . . . as compatible with the provisions es-
sential for the implementation of the object and purpose of the 
[CRC].”189 
It is understandable that, on legal and child rights grounds, so many 
countries objected to the general reservations, which could sharply limit 
the rights of children in these reserving countries. It is puzzling, howev-
er, that the general reservations made by the non-Western States were the 
only reservations that prompted reservations from European States parties. 
The reservations against the antidiscrimination requirements in Article 2 
of the CRC and the holding of nonsovereign territories are just as sweep-
ing as the other general reservations. They withhold human rights protec-
tions from large populations of children, but, strangely, they passed 
without objections. 
B. The Reservations Against the Universal Applicability of the CRC 
The goal of the CRC was to secure universal coverage of children’s 
rights through two steps: achieving universal ratification, and certifying 
that every child within each jurisdiction was covered by the Convention. 
As noted previously, full coverage within the jurisdictions of States par-
ties is established by Article 2 of the CRC, which does not distinguish 
between legal and illegal residents.190 However, the Bahamas, Belgium, 
                                                                                                             
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See CRC, supra note 7, art. 2 (“States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights 
set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrim-
ination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”) (emphases added). 
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New Zealand, and the United Kingdom made reservations to the general 
applicability of the CRC and limited its coverage to legal residents.191 
Despite the fact that these reservations compromise the core intent and 
purpose of the CRC, there were no objections to these reservations. 
C. The Invisibility of Colonialism During the Ratification of the CRC 
The legal status of children within the remaining nonsovereign territo-
ries, most of which are formerly colonial islands, was never an issue un-
der public discussion,192 from the drafting and adoption process all the 
way through to ratification. The status of these children vis-à-vis the 
CRC was communicated postratification in the form of an exchange of 
notes between States parties.193 With the exception of arguments between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina concerning which country held 
rightful dominion over the Falkland Islands, the legitimacy of these hold-
ings was never questioned.194 
Argentina, China, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
communicated their positions regarding the applicability of the CRC in 
territories outside national boundaries under their control.195 At no point 
during the signing, ratification, waging of objections, or exchanging of 
notes was the legitimacy of external control over these territories ques-
tioned. 
D. Summary of Europe’s Reactions to Postcolonial Dissent 
International law’s origin in the colonial encounter is significant and 
affects even postcolonial legislation such as the CRC. The very concept 
of sovereignty serves as an example. Much was made of the reference to 
Islamic law in the general reservations. Judge Sir M. Zafrulla Khan of 
the International Court of Justice explains that, for those who follow Is-
lamic law, it is impossible to place any law higher than the law of Allah: 
“[i]n Islam the concept of the Sovereign is entirely different (from in Eu-
                                                                                                             
 191. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 192. These nonsovereign territories include Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, the British 
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Ducie and Oeno Islands, the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas), the Fore Island, Greenland, Henderson, Hong Kong, the Isle of Man, Macao, 
Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Pitcairn, St. Helena, the St. Helena Dependencies, 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and Toke-
lau. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
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rope) [sic]. Absolute sovereignty pertains to Allah alone.”196 It is this 
aspect of the general reservations that gave rise to Europe’s uniform re-
sponse as manifested in its objections.197 
However, in her article examining the role of cultural relativism in the 
interactions between the U.N. Committee on Human Rights and States 
parties, Sonia Harris-Short shows that the Islamic States’ general reser-
vations do not serve to avoid CRC-mandated obligations, as European 
objectors had feared.198 The facts that Europe reacted to non-European 
concepts of sovereignty, that Europe did not take issue with the holding 
of nonsovereign territories, which could jeopardize coverage of the full 
Convention to large populations of children, and that Europe made reser-
vations to exclude illegal immigrant children from the entire Convention 
are evidence of Europe’s sense of entitlement to international law and its 
investment in keeping international law Eurocentric. In short, European 
States were more concerned that Islamic States parties had declared in-
ternational law to be limited by Islamic law than with ensuring that all 
children were granted rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The colonial structure of international law does not derive solely from 
the law itself. My argument is that the deep colonial structure is a Euro-
pean sense of prerogative to international law as essentially European. 
The deep colonial structure of international law is present through direct 
links between colonial and postcolonial laws in legal concepts and areas 
such as sovereignty, international trade, and human rights. A full postco-
lonial critique, however, is difficult to impose upon the CRC, as the 
drafting process was inclusive of postcolonial States, and the Convention 
has been ratified by every country, except the United States and Somalia. 
Postcolonial States have wholeheartedly embraced the CRC through their 
ratifications. 
For this reason, the CRC provides such an interesting case study of 
what role colonialism might have in an international law that is consi-
dered postcolonial—postcolonial in the sense that formal colonialism had 
ended by the time of its making. This case study of the CRC shows that 
while the deep colonial structure transcends law made during colonial 
times and transcends legal concepts originating in colonial times, the co-
                                                                                                             
 196. M. Zafrulla Khan, Islam: Concept, Law and World Habeas Corpus (A Foreword), 
1 RUTGERS-CAM L.J. 160, 160 (1969). 
 197. This position is more clearly stated in the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human 
Rights in Islam, which notes that all human rights law is subject to Islamic law. See U.N. 
GAOR, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/35 (1992). 
 198. See Harris-Short, supra note 16, at 135–36. 
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lonial structure endures in the legislative process of international law, 
underlying treaty-making procedure even when the treaty is facially neu-
tral. 
The CRC was drafted with the intention of avoiding some obvious 
controversies such as abortion,199 freedom of religion,200 and the econom-
ic disparity between the Global North and the Global South.201 Despite 
these efforts for consensus, many States made reservations.202 The States 
that lodged these reservations are geographically diverse, and the provi-
sions with which these reservations took issue are varied, thereby sug-
gesting that the CRC embodies neutral, if not quite universal, values.203 
In contrast, the objections against reservations share two striking fea-
tures. All the objections were made by European countries, and the reci-
pients are overwhelmingly non-European countries.204 Moreover, the 
reservations that received the most objections are those challenging the 
boundaries of international law by asserting alternatives to European in-
terpretations, alternatives that refer to Shariah law or to national constitu-
tions.205 
It is difficult to deny the European sense of privilege when the only 
States parties to object to reservations are European, and twenty-one of 
the twenty-three parties against whom these objections were directed are 
postcolonial States. Moreover, no States parties objected to European 
reservations that are equally broad in scope, such as excluding a nonciti-
zen child from the CRC or constraining a child’s right to exercise his or 
her culture, reservations that seem to undercut the CRC’s express goal of 
universal coverage. Similarly, States parties that hold jurisdiction outside 
of their main territories stipulated in reservations that they retain the abil-
ity to decide whether the CRC applies to children living in these territo-
ries, and these reservations failed to generate any objections. A study of 
representative postcolonial legislation reveals that even if it is possible to 
legislate “neutral” international law, such law does not operate in a va-
cuum, but rather in an international community in which European na-
                                                                                                             
 199. See CRC, supra note 7, art. 1 (defining a “child” as “every human being below 
the age of eighteen years”). 
 200. Id. art. 14 (deliberately abstaining from using the word “adopt” with reference to 
religion). 
 201. Id. art. 4 (suggesting that compliance with the CRC by poor countries may be 
achieved through “the framework of international co-operation”). 
 202. See CRC Ratifications, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 8. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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tions continue to proceed as if they were entitled to a Eurocentric interna-
tional law. 
 
